Saturday, May 09, 2026

Inside the ‘Financial Infidelities’ That Tear Marriages Apart

It has never been easier to conceal unsavory spending from a spouse. Divorce—and significant financial damage—can follow

By Gunjan Banerji of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"Roughly a third of Americans who have tied the knot said their first marriage ended in divorce"

"what’s known as financial secrecy or infidelity is at the center of many splits. That can mean hiding when an income source dries up, keeping a secret bank account or giving in to any of the financial temptations that have proliferated in recent years, whether it’s sports betting, shopping apps or risky trades."

"The share of couples without any joint bank accounts rose to 23% in 2023, up from 15% in 1996, according to a Census survey last year." ["making it easier to conceal spending"]

"The shift partly reflects the rising age of marriage for American men and women; individual bank accounts were more common for couples who married later.'

"In some cases, funds aren’t just separate, but entirely hidden. When that happens, divorce lawyers can argue that one party was improperly spending assets that belonged to both spouses."

Related posts:

Buy the House First, Get Married Later: Couples’ New Math-Unmarried home buyers say they are giving priority to a financial foundation over a legal one (2025) 

If You Date Me, You Date My Debt: Romance can pose challenges to those with large credit balances, student loans or other financial obligations (2025)

Hey Baby, Can I Get Your Number? And by That, I Mean Your Credit Score (2024)

When It Comes to Marriage and Money, Opposites Attract (2023)

Who Pays on the First Date? No One Knows Anymore, and It’s Really Awkward (2017)

Can Giving Up Money And Material Things Lead To More Love? (2011)

31% Of Americans Cheat On Their Spouses--About Finances (2011)

Can You Put A Price Tag On Love? (2010)

Do Women Really Value Income over Looks in a Mate? by Marina Adshade (2010) 

Should You Break Up With Your FiancĂ© If They Have Too Much Debt?  (2010)

Do Opposites Attract? Not Usually, Except Maybe When It Comes To Money (2009)

When Women Earn More Than Men, Is Dating Affected? (2007)

Friday, May 08, 2026

The % of 25-54 year-olds employed was 80.7% in April same as in March; Average hours worked rose 0.1 to 34.3

One weakness of the unemployment rate is that if people drop out of the labor force they cannot be counted as an unemployed person and the unemployment rate goes down. They are no longer actively seeking work and it might be because they are discouraged workers. The lower unemployment rate can be misleading in this case. People dropping out of the labor force might indicate a weak labor market.

We could look at the employment to population ratio instead, since that includes those not in the labor force. But that includes everyone over 16 and that means that senior citizens are in the group but many of them have retired. The more that retire, the lower this ratio would be and that might be misleading. It would not necessarily mean the labor market is weak.

But we have this ratio for people age 25-54 (which also eliminates many college age people who might not be looking for work).

It was 80.6% in Jan. 2020 and 69.6% in April 2020.  Click here to see the BLS data. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years

2022) 79.883% 
2023) 80.683%
2024) 80.717%
2025) 80.600% (just an 11 month average due to no data for October instead of 12)
 
There have been only 5 months since April 2001 when the % of 25-54 year-olds employed was as high as 80.9%.

The unemployment rate was 4.3% in April after being 4.3% in March. Click here to go to that data. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years

2022) 3.6%
2023) 3.6%
2024) 4.0%
2025) 4.3%
 
Labor Force participation fell to 61.826from 61.882%. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years 
 
2022) 62.2%
2023) 62.6%
2024) 62.6%
2025) 62.4%
 
The % of the adult population employed fell to 59.14% from 59.25% (that is people 16 years old and older).  Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years 
 
2022) 60.0%
2023) 60.3%
2024) 60.1%
2025) 59.7% 
 
Here is the timeline graph of the percentage of 25-54 year olds employed since 2016.
 
 
Now since 1948.  

 
Now hours worked. This comes from the St. Louis FED. See Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, Total Private. It was 34.3 in April and 34.2 in March. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions. 
 
 
 
Related posts: 

"The reason for the discrepancy is that there are two surveys. The establishment survey is used for the Labor Department's monthly jobs report. They contact businesses for this survey. The household survey is used to put together the unemployment rate. The Bureau of Labor Statistics contacts households for this one."

See also Comparing employment from the BLS household and payroll surveys from the BLS.

See U.S. payrolls jump more than expected, but the report had several red flags for the economy by Jeff Cox of CNBC. 

Wednesday, May 06, 2026

Real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.0% in the 1st quarter; was expected to grow 2.2%

See AI Investment Boosted Economic Growth, While Consumers Tapped the Brakes by Harriet Tory of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"U.S. economic growth picked up in the first quarter as businesses invested heavily in artificial intelligence, rebounding from a fourth quarter dented by a government shutdown.

At the same time, the economy didn’t expand as fast as economists expected, weighed down by softer consumer spending growth.

The Commerce Department said U.S. gross domestic product—the value of all goods and services produced across the economy—rose at a seasonally and inflation adjusted 2% annual rate in the first quarter.

Economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal had expected GDP growth of 2.2% for the January-to-March period."

That might not seem like a big deal, just 0.2 percentage points less than expected. In my macro courses we read a chapter in the book The Economics of Macro Issues. The chapter discussed how nations with common law systems, where property rights are better protected than in nations with civil law systems, have higher growth rates. I pointed out to my classes that even a small difference in growth rates ends up causing a very big difference in per capita incomes due to the annual compounding effect.

The table below shows how much per capita income would be at various rates after 100 and 200 years. Assume we start with a per capita income of $1,000. If we grow 2.0% per year, after 100 years it will be $7,245. At 2.1% per year, it would be $7,791 or about $700 more. That is how much that little .1% matters. The difference over 200 years is about $11,000. After 100 years at 2.5% per year, per capita income would be $11,814. That is $4,000 more than the 2.0% rate. Small differences in growth rates add up to big differences over time.

Using the latest GDP figures for another example, if we grow 2.2% a year for the next 30 years, and if per capita GDP now is, say, $94,000, it would reach $180,574. But if it only grows 2.0% for 30 years, per capita GDP would be $170,268. That is about $10,000 less than if we grow 2.2%.

Per Capita Income After 100 and 200 Years At Various Annual Growth Rates (Starting With $1,000)

Tuesday, May 05, 2026

Married Adults Are Less Likely to Get Cancer Than Singles, Study Suggests (a ceteris paribus related case)

Support systems and spouses reminding partners to take care of themselves may contribute

By Aylin Woodward of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"Married people tend to have greater economic stability and better support systems, and they are more likely to stick with treatment"

"Unmarried men had five times the rate of anal cancer; unmarried women experienced three times the rate of cervical cancer. Both of these cancers are linked to the sexually transmitted infection HPV, or human papillomavirus, so the incidences might reflect differences in exposure and screening." 

"Married individuals tend to have healthier behaviors overall, including lower smoking and alcohol use, and more stable sexual and reproductive relationships, all of which are risk factors for cancer"

"They are also more likely to engage in preventive care."

One issue here what exactly does marriage cause? Let's look at some of what the article raises:

"Married people tend to have greater economic stability." Certainly, if you are married you and your spouse might have more stability since you might have two incomes. If one person loses their job, there is still money coming in. But, a person who has greater economic stability is a more attractive marriage partner. The better economic situation of the person might allow them to avoid cancer better and make them more likely to get married. It is not clear how much simply getting married matters (I used to joke in class that we could lower the child poverty rate by having kids under 18 get married because married couples have lower poverty rates than average).

"Married individuals tend to have healthier behaviors" Again, people with healthier behaviors are more attractive partners.

"more stable sexual and reproductive relationships" This might mean that you are only having sex with one person, which is healthier. So maybe marriage is having a big impact. Although people who choose marriage might already like monogamy.

"They are also more likely to engage in preventive care." Having a spouse to remind you of appointments, drive you there and bring up health issues in general can help. So marriage might be causing better health here. But again, if you are more likely to engage in preventive care you are a more attractive partner. One other thing for marriage, you might want to stay healthy to please your spouse.

One last thing, the article does not say anything like "getting married, ceteris paribus or holding all other factors constant, causes your chance of getting cancer to fall 20%." That might be hard to find since there are so many other factors that need to be held constant. 

Other ceteris paribus related posts:

Ceteris and the optimal exercise regimen (2026) 

A case of ceteris paribus: does moderate drinking harm your health? (2025) 

Great Moments In Causation Vs. Correlation: Eat more chocolate, win more Nobels? (2012)

Banning Cell Phones While Driving And A Lesson In Ceteris Paribus (2010) 

Tough Professors Are Better For Students In The Long Run (2011)

Will Studying Economics Make You Rich? A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Returns to College Major (2023)

Studying Economics Increases Wages a Lot (2020)

Sunday, May 03, 2026

Taxes make gas more expensive in other countries

See Why Gasoline Is So Much Cheaper in the U.S. Than Overseas by Chao Deng and Alana Pipe of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"American consumers paid an average $3.64 a gallon in March, with only about 60 cents of that made up of federal and state taxes. The average hit $4 a gallon at the end of that month."

"In most places in Europe, tax composes 50%-60% of the retail price of fuel"

"Germans paid an average of $8.75 a gallon in March, more than half of which stemmed from value-added taxes and fuel excise duties."

"In Mexico, gas averaged $5.07 a gallon in March, of which nearly $2 was tax."

Related posts:

Factors Influencing The Price Of Gas (2011)

Price-gouging laws can backfire (2017)

People say the president can control gas prices if the president belongs to the other party (2017)

Why are refiners' profits so high and can anything bring down gas prices? (2022) 

Gas Station Owners, Blamed When Prices Rose, Face Risks as Prices Fall (2022)

California Has a Gas-Price Mystery: Too High, but Why? Drivers in the most populous U.S. state are paying more at the pump than anyone else. California’s gas taxes and its strict clean-air policies don’t explain away all of the $1.23-a-gallon difference (2023)

How are higher energy prices impacting the economy? (2026) 

Saturday, May 02, 2026

Extractive Taxation and the French Revolution: Between 1750 and 1789, areas in France with heavier tax burdens experienced significantly more riots

By Tommaso Giommoni, Gabriel Loumeau, and Marco Tabellini

"The French Revolution dismantled the ancien rĂ©gime and redefined state power and institutions. It transformed society by abolishing feudalism and establishing modern bureaucratic and legal frameworks, and its influence extended beyond France, shaping institutions worldwide. While the Revolution’s causes were complex, historical accounts have long emphasized the role of fiscal institutions, particularly the extractive nature of taxation under the ancien rĂ©gime. However, systematic evidence on the role taxation played in shaping the Revolution remains limited.

Our research examines how taxation shaped the emergence and escalation of unrest and its influence on political behavior during the Revolution’s early years. Using data on local per capita tax burdens around 1780, we found that bailliages (administrative districts) with heavier tax burdens experienced significantly more riots between 1750 and 1789. Specifically, a shift from a bailliage in the bottom quarter of the tax-burden distribution to one in the top quarter—a difference of roughly 8 percent of per capita income at the time—more than doubled the number of riots during that period. High-tax bailliages were also more likely to be swept into the Great Fear of 1789, when rumors of aristocratic conspiracies spread rapidly across rural France, triggering attacks on manor houses and the destruction of feudal records and ultimately leading the National Assembly to abolish feudalism.

This relationship holds even after accounting for several factors commonly associated with revolutionary unrest, including the spread of Enlightenment ideas, increases in wheat prices, the local presence of aristocrats and clergy, and the size of tax police brigades. It also holds when we narrow the analysis to municipalities on either side of a tax border. One interpretation of these findings is that taxation depressed local economic development, impoverishing communities and thus leading them to revolt for material reasons.

The relationship between taxation and unrest stemmed primarily from taxes on goods rather than on income or profits. This aligns with historical accounts emphasizing popular hostility toward these taxes, viewed as especially regressive, enforced through intrusive state controls, and emblematic of the ancien rĂ©gime’s fiscal inequities. Our research focuses on the salt tax and the traites, a system of internal customs duties. Together, these taxes accounted for over 20 percent of royal revenue by 1780, were deeply resented, and were among the first abolished in 1790.

Our findings provide evidence of widespread opposition to taxation. To examine this idea further, we analyzed the lists of grievances compiled and submitted to Versailles ahead of the Estates General in the spring of 1789. Areas with heavier tax burdens submitted more complaints against taxation, even after accounting for the total number of complaints submitted. This relationship holds only for the Third Estate and not for the nobility, consistent with the fact that commoners bore the brunt of taxation while the nobility was largely exempt. Our research also finds that inequality exacerbated opposition to taxation for reasons beyond its direct economic burden. Many complaints cited the unequal imposition of taxes across social groups and territories, as well as coercive extraction without corresponding public benefits.

The Enlightenment emphasized equality before the law and challenged inherited privilege and arbitrary power. Our findings show that riots were more common in areas with greater exposure to Enlightenment ideas, as measured by local book sales and subscriptions to the Encyclopédie. Local literacy rates do not seem to have played a significant role, indicating that the diffusion of ideas mattered more than access to reading per se.

Tax-related riots peaked in the 1780s, but the reason for this timing is unclear. Taxes on goods had existed for centuries, and the overall burden rose sharply between 1690 and 1760 but changed little thereafter. Instead, historians point to droughts that devastated harvests and drove up wheat prices in the 1780s. Our research uses historical data on temperature and precipitation and finds that hotter-than-average summers led to a larger increase in riots in high-tax municipalities than in their low-tax neighbors. Together with our evidence on tax disparities and Enlightenment exposure, these findings suggest that taxation created the structural foundations for unrest, while material hardship and ideological forces catalyzed long-standing grievances about fiscal inequality into open revolt.

While fiscal grievances fueled the Revolution from below, the decisions of representatives also drove the movement from above. We analyzed more than 60,000 legislative speeches delivered between May 1789, when the Estates General convened, and January 1793, when Louis XVI was executed. Our findings reveal that legislators from high-tax constituencies were about 70 percent more likely to discuss taxation, 60 percent more likely to criticize the ancien régime, and roughly 73 percent more likely to defend the Revolution in tax-related speeches than legislators from low-tax constituencies. These legislators were also more inclined to frame taxation as oppressive and call for fiscal reform.

Beyond fiscal debates, legislators from high-tax constituencies were more likely to demand institutional change, call for the abolition of feudal privileges, and criticize the monarchy in their speeches following the Great Fear of 1789. During the Legislative Assembly (1791–1792), legislators from heavily taxed constituencies were more likely to support abolishing the monarchy and to vote for the king’s execution during the National Convention in January 1793.

Note
This research brief is based on Tommaso Giommoni et al., “Extractive Taxation and the French Revolution,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 34816, February 2026." 

Other history related posts:

MONKS, GENTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS: THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH MONASTERIES 

Did Tea Drinking Cut Mortality Rates in England?

Pre-market societies could sometimes have alot of violence

Did the industrial revolution cause children to take on adult roles later and later? 

Primitive communism: Marx’s idea that societies were naturally egalitarian and communal before farming is widely influential and quite wrong (plus Ruth Benedict on property rights)  

When workers were paid twice a day and given half-hour shopping breaks (Germany, 1923) 

Economics influenced the spread of viral rumors during the French Revolution

When Beer is Safer than Water: Beer Availability and Mortality from Waterborne Illnesses in 18th Century England 

Thursday, April 30, 2026

Frank Knight And John Stuart Mill On The Purpose Of Life And Liberty

Frank Knight was an economics professor at The University of Chicago in the first half of the 20th century. John Stuart Mill was a British philosopher and economist in the 19th century.

Here is an interesting quote from Knight followed by a similar one from John Stuart Mill.

"Life is at bottom an exploration in the field of values, an attempt to discover values, rather than on the basis of knowledge of them to produce and enjoy them to the greatest possible extent. We strive to 'know ourselves,' to find our real wants, more than to get what we want"

Source: Knight, Frank H. 1935. "The Limitations of Scientific Method in Economics," in The Ethics of Competition and other Essays. Harper and Row: New York.

See also Frank Knight’s “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit” 100 Years Later: Without Frank Knight, there would not have been a Chicago School of Economics by John Phelan. 

John Stuart Mill said: “The purpose of liberty is not to give us what we want but to help us grow so that we can best understand our wants.”

See The Forgotten Philosopher by Alan Wolfe in The Chronicle of Higher Education

Related posts:

James Buchanan, Frank Knight and John Stuart Mill on choice and utility functions (2022)

When Self-Interest Isn’t Everything (2008)

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Politics and Your Portfolio Shouldn’t Mix

By Spencer Jakab of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"In September 2024 . . . the long-running University of Michigan survey of consumer sentiment topped 70 . . . was an abysmal 49.7 among self-identified Republicans and a stellar 92.6 among Democrats. That flipped as soon as President Trump was re-elected."

"This January, 81% of Republicans, but just 35% of Democrats, thought [the stock market will rise in the next six months] would. Those numbers were 22% and 43%, respectively, two years earlier."

"presidents don’t affect stocks much themselves"

"An exchange-traded fund with the ticker symbol “MAGA” launched in 2017."

"Another fund, “DEMZ,” launched in 2020."

"Purposely avoiding sectors or cutting exposure to stocks based on politics . . . usually is a recipe for regret." (the article mentions that neither fund has done as well as the overall market)

Related posts:

People gave up a chance to win money in order to avoid hearing from those with opposing political views (2017) 

People say the president can control gas prices if the president belongs to the other party (2017)

Are some blue jeans really Democratic and others Republican? (2019)

Why Are Americans So Distrustful of Each Other? (2021)

"In 2017, around 70% of Democrats said that Donald Trump voters couldn't be trusted, and around 70% of Republicans said the same of Hillary Clinton voters" 

More and more, executives at major corporations belong to the same politcal party and tend to leave their companies if they are in the minority party there (2022) 

Adam Smith Meets Jonathan Haidt (on political polarization and the animosity of hostile factions)  (2023)

Why Tribalism Took Over Our Politics: Social science gives an uncomfortable explanation: Our brains were made for conflict (2023) 

Democrats and Republicans say economy is improving, but mostly only when someone from their party is president (2024) 

Did Fracking in Pennsylvania Turn Democrats Into Republicans and Republicans Into Democrats? (2024)

Are fewer Democrats buying Teslas because of Elon Musk's political views? (2024)

Partisanship deeply colors how Americans think about trade policy, especially tariffs (2024) 

Would you give up some income in order to get a job at a firm whose workers share your political opinions? (2024)

Republicans Are Feeling Good Again, Driving Up Consumer Sentiment: Democrats’ sentiment slips, but overall index ticks higher (2024)

Causes and Extent of Increasing Partisan Segregation in the U.S. – Evidence from Migration Patterns of 212 Million Voters (2025)

Red vs. Blue Is Dividing Stock Portfolios Like Never Before: A political gap in optimism about markets is translating into trading decisions (2025)

Can testosterone shift political preferences? (2025)

What does conservatism mean? Fewer taxes & regulations or preserving traditional values and communities? A Republican county in Tennessee faces this question when farmers go against land developers (2025)

Poor whites used to vote for Democratic presidential candidates while rich whites voted Repulican. This has now reversed (2026)

Elites moved toward democrats more than nonelites moved away: Income, education, and occupational class in US presidential elections, 1980–2020 (2026) 

See also Americans start caring more about deficits and the national debt when the party they oppose runs them up by John V. Kane of New York University and Ian G. Anson of The University of Maryland. Excerpt:

"In the past two decades, US budget deficits have skyrocketed, and the national debt is now over $22 trillion. But do Americans care about the size of deficits and the national debt? In new research, John V. Kane and Ian G. Anson find that people tend to care more about the deficits and debts when they are increased by presidents from the party that they oppose. Both Republicans and Democrats, they write, become less concerned about governments running deficits when their President is in charge." 

Tuesday, April 28, 2026

College Graduates Are Finally Catching a Break in This Job Market

Several new signals suggest employers are boosting entry-level hiring this spring after gloomier projections just months ago

By Ray A. Smith and Te-Ping Chen of the WSJ

This might be a bit surprising. See the first posts listed below under "Related posts." One is from last Dec. and the other is from last June and they both had grim news for young job seekers. 

Excerpts from the WSJ article:

"A widely watched survey . . . out Monday shows employers expect to boost new-graduate hires by 5.6% this spring from a year ago"

"nearly a third of employers planned to hire a greater share of entry-level workers this year than the previous one."

"unemployment among 20- to 24-year-olds with bachelor’s degrees and higher dropped sharply in March to 5.3%"

"That is down from a decade high, excluding the pandemic’s early months, of 8.9% last fall."

"In some cases, artificial intelligence is spurring hires by enabling companies to expand services and product lines"

"[the % of graduates] "who said they landed a role within three months of graduation climbed to 77% from 63% last year" 

Other related posts:

Companies Predict 2026 Will Be the Worst College Grad Job Market in Five Years: Hires from the Class of 2026 will stay largely flat, employers project, as layoffs rise and AI is able to do more entry-level tasks (Dec. 2025) 

Young Graduates Are Facing an Employment Crisis: Slow hiring is especially daunting for those just starting out; ‘Right now, I’m pretending employment doesn’t exist’ (June 2025) 

What Happens When a Whole Generation Never Grows Up? As American 30-somethings increasingly bypass the traditional milestones of adulthood, economists are warning that what seemed like a lag may in fact be a permanent state of arrested development (2025) 

The White-Collar Hiring Rut Is Here. That’s Bad News for Young College Grads. (2024)

The Class of 2023 Faces a Jittery Job Market: ‘The World Seems to Have Flipped on Its Head.’ (2023) 

The Class of 2020 Looks for Work (2020)

Historically, college students who graduate into a recession have settled for lower-paying jobs at less prestigious companies (2020)

Has The Recession Been Hard On College Graduates? (2010)

How Recessions Affect Young People (2010)

Sunday, April 26, 2026

The Economics of Religion

Faiths thrive when they demand more of their participants—and so do their broader societies

By Roland Fryer. He is an economics professor at Harvard. 

After the excerpts from Fryer's articles I have some from an article by Bryan Caplan. Fryer seems to focus on the cost of participation in a church while Caplan focuses on the cost of holding a belief in a super natural god and miraculous events (altho Fryer touches on belief as well). So they might not be talking about exactly the same thing. But they both make good points. 

Fryer's excerpts:

"Why does religion persist despite asking so much—time, money, behavioral constraint, belief in claims that resist verification? Why does the market fragment rather than consolidate?"

"The church [Fryer grew up in] provided more than belief. It provided mutual insurance: a network of people who, in moments of need, would show up for one another." 

"Such systems have a familiar problem: free-riding. If the benefits of membership are available at low cost, people have an incentive to take without contributing."

"religion . . . has converged on a remarkably consistent solution: make participation costly."

"The demands religion places on its members aren’t barriers to participation. They are the mechanism by which participation becomes valuable."

"When participation requires visible sacrifice . . . commitment becomes observable." 

"Religious communities produce things—solidarity, insurance, belonging—that are valuable only if members contribute. High costs screen out free-riders and raise the quality of the group."

"The more a tradition demands, the more intensely its members participate."

"when the Catholic Church undertook sweeping reforms after Vatican II—moving Mass from Latin to the local language, softening centuries-old doctrinal positions, loosening practices—attendance fell substantially across Catholic countries, declining about 20 percentage points more than in Protestant countries between 1965 and 2015."

[a research paper found] "Belief in heaven and hell is positively associated with economic growth."

"Internalized belief shapes work ethic, honesty and willingness to cooperate with strangers."

"Sitting in the pew, on its own, does nothing. What drives the effect is conviction—belief internalized deeply enough to change behavior when no one is watching."

"participation is higher where there is more competition among denominations."

For an alternate view, see Why Religious Beliefs Are Irrational, and Why Economists Should Care by Bryan Caplan, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University. Excerpts:

"Larry Iannaccone and his co-author Rodney Stark once wrote that the belief that society is getting less religious says “less about empirical fact than it does about secularization faith — a faith that, despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, sustains the conviction of many social scientists that religious institutions must soon decay...” In short, belief in secularization is just a religion.

Larry’s critics were, unsurprisingly, not pleased. To tell people that their non-religious beliefs are just a religion is an insult. Why is it an insult? There isn’t any nice way to answer, so I’ll be blunt. It is an insult because the way that people form religious beliefs is so intellectually irresponsible that their conclusions are almost guaranteed to be false. People:

  • accept their religious beliefs with little or no evidence

  • accept religious beliefs that are contrary to the evidence

  • accept religious beliefs without studying competing views

  • are certain about religious beliefs that are dubious at best, and

  • accept their religious beliefs not because they are intellectually compelling, but because they are emotionally comforting.

Forming non-religious beliefs in a religious way is irrational because forming any beliefs in a religious way is irrational."

"Larry has won a great deal of attention for his rational choice theory of religion. But if you look closely, he doesn’t really have a rational choice theory of religion; he has a rational choice theory of group membership. As Larry occasionally admits, virtually everything that he says about religion applies just as well to fraternities, chess clubs, and football teams. Yes, belonging to a fraternity has costs and benefits; yes, competition between fraternities leads to more efficient outcomes. And both religions and fraternities have been known to use what Larry calls “bizarre” rules — such as “You can’t drink any alcohol,” or “You can only drink alcohol,” to exclude half-hearted members.

What Larry’s research strangely neglects — or, to use his word, “sidesteps” — is the differences between religions and fraternities. The most obvious of these, the 800-pound gorilla in the room, is doctrine. Fraternities don’t have much of a doctrine; religions do. To ignore doctrine is to ignore the very thing that makes religion special — and the main reason why critics of religion consider it irrational. Furthermore, to ignore doctrine is to sidestep the deepest objection to Larry’s rational choice view of religion: How can you have a rational choice theory of irrational belief?

Larry’s neglect of irrational beliefs is glaring because in the last decade economists have started to take irrationality seriously. Behavioral economists emphasize, for example, that people overestimate the riskiness of air travel because plane crashes are vivid and memorable. But if that’s irrational, how much more irrational is it to believe that someone rose from the dead because one old book says so?"

"What would economists learn if they started paying attention to the doctrinal side of religion? Now is my time for shameless self-promotion. In a series of papers on what I call “rational irrationality,” I try to handle the deep objection that Larry sidesteps. I defend a rational choice theory of irrational belief. The gist of my theory is that people persistently hold wildly irrational religious beliefs because the material cost is usually very low. In terms of daily life, what difference does it make if the earth is 6000 years old or 6 billion? So it’s not surprising how readily people shut their eyes to the geological evidence. In contrast, when the cost of irrationality is high, believers conveniently forget the teachings of their religion. Lots of religions promise paradise to martyrs, but adherents eager to die for their beliefs are one-in-a-million.

Is religion rational? In an important sense, NO. The doctrines of every religion are at best extremely improbable, but adherents are still very certain about them. Religious beliefs and standard economic models don’t fit together. However, rather than ignoring or denying this incompatibility, economists should deal with it. If I’m right, it’s not hard. Yes, religious beliefs are irrational, but they are so divorced from reality that they are rarely costly. When they do become costly, a few fanatics lay down their lives, but the overwhelming majority of the faithful open their eyes and face the fact that it’s crazy to bet your life on fairy tales."

Related posts:

Can You Mix Economics With Religion? The ancient Greeks sure thought you could. They had a god of commerce and a god of wealth (2025) 

Religious advice on investing (2025) 

Vatican Tells Catholics How to Make ‘Faith-Consistent’ Investments (2022)

Should you invest according to religious guidelines? (2017)

Can You Find Virtue by Investing in Vice? (2006)

Another Book Relates Religion to Economics (2007)

Can You Mix Economics With Religion? (2022)

Does Economics Trump Religion (2022)

New Book Uses Economics to Analyze Religion (2006)

Religion and Growth (2024) 

The Freaknomics blog has a good article about people donating more money to their churches if other people can see how much they are donating called “We Pretend We Are Christians”