Monday, April 06, 2026

Why the Cost of Your Coffee Has Soared—and Isn’t Going Down Soon

By Inti Pacheco of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"Behind the jump: Extreme weather, including droughts in Brazil and Vietnam, had hit coffee crops. And even before any tariff increases, hedge-fund bets anticipating the levies were pushing commodity prices higher." (droughts cause supply to shift to the left which raises price)

"Then in July, President Trump slapped an additional 40% tariff on goods from Brazil, which produces more than a third of the world’s coffee" (tariffs also cause supply to shift to the left because sellers need to get a higher price for any quantity supplied-this is like an excise tax)

"Another reason commodity prices are surging again? The same speculative trading that contributed to price surges early last year is ramping up again." (when buyers expect higher prices in the future demand today increases which actually causes the price to rise now)

"Now, after commodity coffee prices dipped in recent months, concerns about the Iran war and stepped-up trading in coffee futures markets are driving them up again."

"Now, surging fuel and freight costs caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a new round of coffee-contract purchases and rise in commodity coffee prices."

Related posts:

Coffee Market Goes Cold as Brazilian Weather Normalizes: Futures prices have plunged since August, with coffee-growing conditions bouncing back from last season’s drought and frost (2022)

The above post has a supply and demand graph that shows how the demand for coffee is very inelastic so any supply decrease means a large price increase

Can Coffee Bean Growers Be Like OPEC? (2019)

Americans Are the Ones Paying for Tariffs, Study Finds: Research contradicts President Trump’s claim that foreigners are footing the bill, and could weaken his hand in the dispute over Greenland (2026) 

This post has has a supply and demand graph that shows how and why supply decreases when there is a tax like a tariff or excise tax

Sunday, April 05, 2026

Is there something about manufacturing that requires special policies to help it that other industries don't get?

I have excerpts from posts or articles by three different economists. The answer seems to be no. Two are older and one is very recent by Harvard prof Jason Furman, who was once the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under Obama. Then two older sources. One is from Tyler Cowen (2023), professor at George Mason University and the other is from UC Berkeley Christina Romer (2012). She was also chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under Obama. 

See Every President Tries It. It Never Works by Jason Furman. 

Excerpts:

"In a full accounting, during the first full month of his second term, the United States lost 2,000 manufacturing jobs. Losses continued almost every month, totaling 100,000 manufacturing jobs since January 2025."

"In his 2024 State of the Union address, President Joe Biden declared, “We’ve got 800,000 new manufacturing jobs in America and counting.” The next morning the Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that the economy had lost 4,000 manufacturing jobs the previous month. More losses followed, in almost every subsequent month of Mr. Biden’s presidency, totaling 202,000 in his last year. The 800,000 new jobs he exulted in were not the beginning of a sustained recovery of manufacturing but rather the return of some of the 1.4 million positions lost during the Covid pandemic."

"Reversing the loss of manufacturing jobs is extremely hard — and not necessarily desirable."

"Manufacturing job share has been dwindling in nearly all middle- and high-income countries. By one analysis, China lost more than 30 million of those jobs from 2011 to 2020, more than twice as many as the number of jobs that exist in the entire U.S. manufacturing sector. Yet total employment continued to grow"

"Manufacturing output, meanwhile, has risen, because workers now produce far more per hour using better and more sophisticated equipment. Today a given number of autoworkers can make, according to my calculations, three times as many cars in a year as they could 50 years ago.

The problem is that consumers do not want three times as many cars. Even as people get richer, they increase their spending on manufactured goods only modestly, preferring instead to spend more on services like travel, health care and dining out. There are only so many cars a family can own, but that’s not the case for expensive vacations or fancy meals. As a result we have fewer people working in auto factories and more people working in luxury resorts and the like.

These forces — rising productivity but steady demand — explain why the United States was losing manufacturing job share as far back as the 1950s and 1960s, long before trade became a major factor. The downward trend changed little after the U.S. entered NAFTA in 1994 or granted permanent normal trade relations to China in 2000. Economists continue to debate the magnitude of the “China shock,” but though it hit some regions harder than others, much of the research suggests that overall, it was responsible for a small fraction of the total manufacturing jobs lost since then."

 

"When governments try to reverse the trend, they mostly succeed only in shifting jobs from one industry to another rather than expanding manufacturing overall. Tariffs on steel, for example, may protect jobs in steel production, but they cost jobs in downstream industries such as automobiles by raising costs and undermining global competitiveness.

Subsidies for targeted industries — Mr. Biden’s preferred approach, particularly for microchips and green energy — have similar trade-offs. They help the favored industries but they also drive up construction and equipment costs across the board, making it harder for companies in other arenas to compete. So instead of creating more jobs overall, the subsidized industries just crowd out unsubsidized ones.

Efforts to revive manufacturing are rooted in nostalgia. Once upon a time, manufacturing jobs provided a reliable pathway to the middle class, offering a wage premium to workers without a college degree. In 1970, roughly 80 percent of manufacturing workers had no more than a high school education. Today that figure is closer to 40 percent.

Manufacturing jobs also used to pay more than nonmanufacturing jobs with similar skill requirements. Not anymore: Today people in nonmanagerial manufacturing jobs average $30 an hour as compared with $32 for truck drivers, $33 for wholesale trade workers and $38 for construction workers. Trying to push more people into manufacturing jobs is therefore more likely to harm the middle class than help it." 

See The manufacturing delusion? by Tyler Cowen.

"From an excellent feature article from The Economist:

It is far from clear such [manufacturing] jobs can be brought back—no matter how much governments spend. For a start, the manufacturing wage premium has fallen sharply. Production workers’ wages in America now lag behind those of similar service-sector workers by 5%. Moreover, the sort of high-tech factories that America and Europe are attempting to attract are highly automated, meaning they are no longer a significant source of employment for people with few qualifications…

According to the IMF, the gap between manufacturing and services productivity growth has shrunk in many countries since the turn of the millennium. In China and India its direction has flipped, with services productivity rising faster. Moreover, services are a broad church, ranging from teaching to tech. The latter boasts extremely fast productivity growth, which may soon be propelled further by artificial intelligence."

See also Do Manufacturers Need Special Treatment? by Christina D. Romer. From The NY Times in 2012.

"EVERYONE seems to be talking about a crisis in manufacturing. Workers, business leaders and politicians lament the decline of this traditionally central part of the American economy. President Obama, in his State of the Union address, singled out manufacturing for special tax breaks and support. Many go further, by urging trade restrictions or direct government investment in promising industries.

A successful argument for a government manufacturing policy has to go beyond the feeling that it’s better to produce “real things” than services. American consumers value health care and haircuts as much as washing machines and hair dryers. And our earnings from exporting architectural plans for a building in Shanghai are as real as those from exporting cars to Canada.

The economic rationales for a policy aimed specifically at shoring up manufacturing largely fall into three categories. None are completely convincing:

MARKET FAILURES Government intervention can be justified on efficiency grounds if the free market won’t work well. For example, when competition in a market is limited, antitrust laws that prevent monopoly can be helpful.

In manufacturing, the market can malfunction if there are positive externalities across companies. That means that some benefits of a manufacturing plant go to companies other than the one deciding whether to build it. Clusters of manufacturing businesses can be more productive than an individual one. As a result, when an entrepreneur sets up a plant, some of the benefits accrue to other businesses in the area.

This argument could justify government subsidies or tax breaks. But large clustering effects have been hard to find. A study by Professors Glenn Ellison of M.I.T. and Edward Glaeser of Harvard showed that in many industries, businesses were only modestly more clustered than if they were allocated randomly — suggesting that the benefits, while real, may often be small.

Moreover, the logic of clustering’s benefits is likely to apply outside manufacturing. Software development, insurance and entertainment are three service industries where we observe clustering and where positive externalities may be large. Why single out manufacturing for special treatment? 

A related argument for subsidizing manufacturing involves learning by doing. It takes time for a production process to become efficient. But whether learning creates a role for government depends on whether the eventual returns are captured by the company taking the risk. If the company that jumps in first and eventually succeeds reaps all the rewards, there’s not a market failure. The company needs to count the learning period as part of the investment cost. And with well-functioning capital markets, it should be able to find investors without government help.

On the other hand, if an early entrant paves the way, but other companies come in later and snatch the rewards, government intervention could be helpful. In this situation, private entrepreneurs may not do as much early investment as would be good for the economy. Still, a study of the semiconductor industry found that although learning by doing was substantial, most of the rewards went to companies doing the early investing. And what spillovers there were, crossed national borders.

The possible externality of greatest concern may be national defense. The argument that we need a strong manufacturing base in case of war must be taken seriously. But it still doesn’t follow that all manufacturing deserves special treatment. Which industries are truly essential in a war effort? And might normal production in military industries, as well as existing supply arrangements with allies, provide adequate protection?

Without compelling evidence of special market failures in manufacturing, it might be better to enact policies that will make all American businesses and workers more productive and successful. President Obama mentioned some in his State of the Union address: expansion and enforcement of free trade agreements; public investment in basic science, infrastructure and education; and corporate tax reform.

JOBS A key argument for encouraging manufacturing is to create jobs and reduce unemployment. Unfortunately, those effects are probably small.

Unemployment today is high, but not because of a decline in manufacturing. That decline has been going on for 30 years — and for most of the 1990s and 2000s, the unemployment rate was less than 6 percent.

Today, we face a profound shortfall of demand. That truly is a terrible market failure, and it warrants government intervention. But we need actions that raise overall demand — like a tax cut for households so they have more take-home pay to spend, more aid to troubled state and local governments, and public investments in infrastructure. These are all things that President Obama has advocated.

A narrow tax cut for manufacturing is unlikely to raise aggregate demand significantly. By making our industrial goods cheaper, it might stimulate foreign demand, but probably not enough to make a dent in our unemployment rate. On the other hand, more aggressive monetary policy that lowered the price of the dollar would stimulate all our exports, and so have far more impact.

At the same time, plant shutdowns by large manufacturing companies leave huge holes in local job markets, and moving is very costly for dislocated workers with ties to their communities. There’s surely a role for government to help these devastated areas.

One little-emphasized component of the president’s manufacturing plan is $6 billion of tax credits for any type of company investing in communities that have suffered the closing of a military base or another major job loss. A spate of new research suggests that such “place-based” policies may be effective in raising local employment and wages.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION A final argument for supporting manufacturing is distributional. Manufacturing jobs are seen as one of the few sources of well-paying jobs for less-educated workers. Indeed, in the four decades after World War II, manufacturing jobs paid more than other jobs for given skills.

But that is much less true today. Increased international competition has forced American manufacturers to reduce costs. As a result, the pay premium for low-skilled workers in manufacturing is smaller than it once was.

Today, manufacturing wages are high largely because production is capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated. As a result, educational requirements have risen. Now, more than half of manufacturing workers have some college education, up from just over 20 percent in 1969.

There are sectors where workers with good educations could earn good wages if the economy were healthy. Why focus on manufacturing to create such jobs? Instead, government could make it easier for workers to get the education needed for high-skilled jobs in many fields — and encourage business formation wherever entrepreneurs see a promising opportunity.

If increasing income equality is the goal, it might be wiser to put money into infrastructure than to subsidize manufacturing. Construction also pays good wages, but with lower educational requirements. And America’s infrastructure needs are enormous. Or, we could redistribute income through the tax code — economists’ traditional tool.

AS an economic historian, I appreciate what manufacturing has contributed to the United States. It was the engine of growth that allowed us to win two world wars and provided millions of families with a ticket to the middle class. But public policy needs to go beyond sentiment and history. It should be based on hard evidence of market failures, and reliable data on the proposals’ impact on jobs and income inequality. So far, a persuasive case for a manufacturing policy remains to be made, while that for many other economic policies is well established."

Friday, April 03, 2026

The % of 25-54 year-olds employed was 80.7% in March, same as Feb.; Average hours worked fell 0.1 to 34.2

One weakness of the unemployment rate is that if people drop out of the labor force they cannot be counted as an unemployed person and the unemployment rate goes down. They are no longer actively seeking work and it might be because they are discouraged workers. The lower unemployment rate can be misleading in this case. People dropping out of the labor force might indicate a weak labor market.

We could look at the employment to population ratio instead, since that includes those not in the labor force. But that includes everyone over 16 and that means that senior citizens are in the group but many of them have retired. The more that retire, the lower this ratio would be and that might be misleading. It would not necessarily mean the labor market is weak.

But we have this ratio for people age 25-54 (which also eliminates many college age people who might not be looking for work).

It was 80.6% in Jan. 2020 and 69.6% in April 2020.  Click here to see the BLS data. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years

2022) 79.883% 
2023) 80.683%
2024) 80.717%
2025) 80.600% (just an 11 month average due to no data for October instead of 12)
 
There have been only 5 months since April 2001 when the % of 25-54 year-olds employed was as high as 80.9%. 

The unemployment rate was 4.3% in March after being 4.4% in Feb. Click here to go to that data. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years

2022) 3.6%
2023) 3.6%
2024) 4.0%
2025) 4.3%
 
Labor Force participation fell to 61.88from 62.05%. Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years 
 
2022) 62.2%
2023) 62.6%
2024) 62.6%
2025) 62.4%
 
The % of the adult population employed fell to 59.25% from 59.29% (that is people 16 years old and older).  Here is what it was for each of the last 4 years 
 
2022) 60.0%
2023) 60.3%
2024) 60.1%
2025) 59.7% 
 
Here is the timeline graph of the percentage of 25-54 year olds employed since 2016.
 
  
Now since 1948.  
 
  
Now hours worked. This comes from the St. Louis FED. See Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, Total Private. It was 34.3 in Feb. and 34.2 in March. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions. 
 
 
 
Related posts: 

"The reason for the discrepancy is that there are two surveys. The establishment survey is used for the Labor Department's monthly jobs report. They contact businesses for this survey. The household survey is used to put together the unemployment rate. The Bureau of Labor Statistics contacts households for this one."

See also Comparing employment from the BLS household and payroll surveys from the BLS.

Click here to see a good Twitter thread on the jobs report (including wages) from Harvard economist Jason Furman.

See U.S. payrolls rose by 178,000 in March, more than expected; unemployment at 4.3% by Jeff Cox of CNBC.    

Thursday, April 02, 2026

When Humanoid Robots Come to a Small-Town Factory

Two-legged robots have taken over a job in a South Carolina auto parts plant. That’s just the start.

By John Keilman of The WSJ

Right after this post I repost a blog entry from 2016 called Automation Can Actually Create More Jobs. Then after that are links to other posts on jobs, robots & automation.   

Excerpts:

[A robot carries] "a 25-pound basket of bearing components . . . and walks it over to a conveyor that will send it through an industrial washing machine."

"A year ago, a person did this job.  Now it belongs to a humanoid robot called Digit that was built for grunt work."

"Schaeffler, a global manufacturer that makes parts for cars and airplanes, said it plans to deploy more of the robots in the coming months."

"Agility [an Oregon-based startup] wouldn’t give Digit’s price tag, but over the life of a robot, the costs work out to $10 to $25 an hour, depending on whether a company buys or rents it. Damion Shelton, Agility’s co-founder, has said it could eventually fall to $2 or $3 an hour. Entry-level positions at Schaeffler’s Cheraw plant, which isn’t unionized, start at $20 an hour." 

Automation Can Actually Create More Jobs

Evidence shows increased productivity leads to more wealth, cheaper goods, greater spending power and ultimately, more jobs

By Christopher Mims of the WSJ.

There are four types of unemployment: seasonal, structural, frictional and cyclical.

Structural unemployment is unemployment caused by a mismatch between the skills of job seekers and the requirements of available jobs.

One example of this is when you are replaced by a machine, like bank tellers who were replaced by ATMs. Another example is when there is a fall in demand for your product, so you get laid off, like with typewriters since people now use computers. A third example is geographical, when the jobs are not in your region of the country.

But automation may not be a problem, even in the case of ATMs. Excerpts from the article:
"Since the 1970s, when automated teller machines arrived, the number of bank tellers in America has more than doubled. James Bessen, an economist who teaches at Boston University School of Law, points to that seeming paradox amid new concerns that automation is “stealing” human jobs. To the contrary, he says, jobs and automation often grow hand in hand."

"Sometimes, of course, machines really do replace humans, as in agriculture and manufacturing"

"a long trail of empirical evidence shows that the increased productivity brought about by automation and invention ultimately leads to more wealth, cheaper goods, increased consumer spending power and ultimately, more jobs.

In the case of bank tellers, the spread of ATMs meant bank branches could be smaller, and therefore, cheaper. Banks opened more branches, and in total employed more tellers, Mr. Bessen says.

Some individuals are uprooted and suffer. In 1900, 40% of U.S. workers toiled in agriculture; today, that figure is less than 2%. Manufacturing employment in industrialized countries has declined in recent decades, as fewer people make more goods. But society, on the whole, has come out ahead.
It’s true that technology alters the quality, as well as the quantity, of jobs"

[a study] "found big increases in both low-paying and high-paying jobs. There are more barbers and barkeepers. But there also are more accountants and nurses, reflecting the rising complexity of the modern economy.

Paradoxically, says Mr. Stewart, many of the fields most transformed by technology have produced the biggest increases in employment, from medicine to management consulting. “What we saw was that machines and people were highly complementary,” he says.

Such bifurcated labor markets have ill effects. Disappearing factory jobs have largely been replaced by jobs in the service sector, where highly skilled workers, like doctors and computer programmers, are paid more, while many others see to the comfort and health of the affluent. In the middle, wages have stagnated, helping spawn our current age of populism.

“The era of mass manufacturing employment in the 1960s and 1970s was a good thing,” says Dr. Autor. “It created a lot of good jobs, it needed a lot of hands and eyes, and required some skills but not an enormous skill set. The work was relatively high value added.” But, he adds, that era is for the most part behind us."

"For all the recent advances in artificial intelligence, such techniques are largely applied to narrow areas, such as recognizing images and processing speech. Humans can do all these things and more, which allows us to transition to new kinds of work."

"the problem is not “mass unemployment, it’s transitioning people from one job to another.”"

"Near the end of the 19th century, America’s agricultural states faced the prospect of mass unemployment as farms automated.

In response, they created the “high school movement,” which required everyone to stay in school until age 16. It was hugely expensive, both because of the new schools and teachers, but also because these young people could no longer work on the farm. But it better prepared workers for 20th century factory jobs" 

Related posts:

AI startups are literally paying people to fold their laundry (or perform similar chores) (2025)

"Companies such as EncordMicro1, and Scale AI have launched paid “data collection” programs aimed at generating real-world video datasets for robotic learning." 

America’s Newest Auto Plant Is Full of Robots. It Still Needs the Human Touch: Hyundai’s sprawling complex in Georgia illustrates advanced manufacturing’s balance between people and machines (2025) 

No, AI Robots Won’t Take All Our Jobs: Instead, they will boost productivity, lower prices and spur the evolution of the labor market (2025) (it also has links to 14 other related posts from before 2024)

IBM CEO Says AI Has Replaced Hundreds of Workers but Created New Programming, Sales Jobs: The tech company promises higher total employment as it reinvests resources toward roles like software development (2025)

Technological Disruption in the Labor Market (2025)

Why AI Might Not Take All Our Jobs—if We Act Quickly (2025)

Some good news on productivity (2025) (AI is mentioned)

Some economics of A.I. (2025) 

The AI-Generated Population Is Here, and They’re Ready to Work (2024)

Two recent articles on robots and human workers (2024)

Self-service kiosks at McDonald’s are not reducing employment (2024) 

Robots writing science fiction (2024)

Amazon’s New Robotic Warehouse Will Rely Heavily on Human Workers (2024) 

Wednesday, April 01, 2026

Will AI data centers cause economies of scale in the power industry?

See The Electric Grid Needs Huge Upgrades. No One Knows Who Will Pay for Them: Utilities around the U.S. are set to spend tens of billions of dollars on high-voltage lines, largely to meet demand from data centers by Katherine Blunt and Jennifer Hiller of The WSJ.

Economies of scale is when more capital is built (like a larger factory for more extensive grid system) that allows for more output (see related post below on the Model-T). The increase in quantity is larger than the increase in total cost (in percentage terms). So the average cost falls.

Excerpts:

"The AI build-out is driving up electricity costs in some places, an issue that has angered politicians and spurred intervention by the Trump administration. The White House this month announced that seven of the nation’s largest tech companies had agreed to pay for all the costs associated with powering new data centers."

"the prices utilities charge to customers. That is overseen by state regulators, who have in recent years approved rate increases as utilities make investments not only to support data centers but also to upgrade the grid to withstand more extreme weather and replace parts that are decades old."

"Transmission spending, though, poses challenges for utilities and regulators in determining how costs should be divided. In many places, some transmission costs will be shared among customers other than tech companies because the upgrades may benefit the broader system.

“Data center developers have said they want to pay their fair share, but the question is, what does fair mean?” said Timothy Fox, managing director at ClearView Energy Partners. “Cost allocation for transmission has always been a very complex and difficult question. It’s an imperfect science.”

The utility industry argues that adding data centers has the potential to lower costs for other customers, as they could spread shared costs over a greater volume of electricity sales. That has been the case in some places such as North Dakota." (this is where the economies of scales comes in)

"Brent Bennett, a director at the conservative Texas Public Policy Foundation, said the costs could fall more heavily on residential customers than on the companies that are creating the new demand. His organization has estimated that the average ratepayer will pay somewhere between about $150 and $225 a year for the transmission projects that have been recently approved."

Related post:

Jeopardy and the inflation adjusted price of a 1908 Ford Model T (2023)

This site, Ford Model T Original Prices, from FordModelT.net run by Mitchell Taylor shows all the prices of the different body styles for the Model T from 1909 to 1927 (as well as drawings of some them).

The cheapest in 1909 was the Runabout with a price of $825. The price generally kept falling and by 1925 a buyer only paid $260. That is a drop of about 68%.

But, adjusting for inflation, what would you have to pay in 1925 for something that cost $825 in 1909? Prices were 93% higher in 1925 than in 1909. So if the price of the Runabout had just kept up with inflation, it would have been $1,592 in 1925. Yet it was only $260. That means the price actually fell about 84%, adjusted for inflation.

Monday, March 30, 2026

How Odysseus Started The Industrial Revolution

Factory work may have been a commitment device to get everyone to work hard. Odysseus tying himself to the mast was also a commitment device. Dean Karlan, Yale economics professor explains how commitment devices work:

"This idea of forcing one’s own future behavior dates back in our culture at least to Odysseus, who had his crew tie him to the ship’s mast so he wouldn’t be tempted by the sirens; and Cortes, who burned his ships to show his army that there would be no going back.

Economists call this method of pushing your future self into some behavior a “commitment device.” [Related: a Freakonomics podcast on the topic is called "Save Me From Myself."] From my WSJ op-ed:
Most of us don’t have crews and soldiers at our disposal, but many people still find ways to influence their future selves. Some compulsive shoppers will freeze their credit cards in blocks of ice to make sure they can’t get at them too readily when tempted. Some who are particularly prone to the siren song of their pillows in the morning place their alarm clock far from their bed, on the other side of the room, forcing their future self out of bed to shut it off. When MIT graduate student Guri Nanda developed an alarm clock, Clocky, that rolls off a night stand and hides when it goes off, the market beat a path to her door."
 See What Can We Learn From Congress and African Farmers About Losing Weight?

Something like this came up recently in the New York Times, in reference to factory work and the Industrial Revolution. See Looking at Productivity as a State of Mind. From the NY Times, 9-27-2014. By SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, a professor of economics at Harvard. Excerpts:
"Greg Clark, a professor of economics at the University of California, Davis, has gone so far as to argue that the Industrial Revolution was in part a self-control revolution. Many economists, beginning with Adam Smith, have argued that factories — an important innovation of the Industrial Revolution — blossomed because they allowed workers to specialize and be more productive.

Professor Clark argues that work rules truly differentiated the factory. People working at home could start and finish when they wanted, a very appealing sort of flexibility, but it had a major drawback, he said. People ended up doing less work that way.

Factories imposed discipline. They enforced strict work hours. There were rules for when you could go home and for when you had to show up at the beginning of your shift. If you arrived late you could be locked out for the day. For workers being paid piece rates, this certainly got them up and at work on time. You can even see something similar with the assembly line. Those operations dictate a certain pace of work. Like a running partner, an assembly line enforces a certain speed.

As Professor Clark provocatively puts it: “Workers effectively hired capitalists to make them work harder. They lacked the self-control to achieve higher earnings on their own.”

The data entry workers in our study, centuries later, might have agreed with that statement. In fact, 73 percent of them did agree to this statement: “It would be good if there were rules against being absent because it would help me come to work more often.”"
The workers, like Odyssues, tied themselves to the mast to resist the temptation of slacking. This made it possible for factories to generate the large output of the Industrial Revolution.

Here is the link to the Journal of Economic History article by Professor Clark

Factory Discipline

Here is the abstract 

Related posts:  

Would you pay someone to make you work hard? (2022)

Can You Mix Economics With Religion? (The ancient Greeks a god of commerce and a god of wealth) (2022)

Are payday-routine videos a commitment device? (2023)

An Economic Approach to Homer's Odyssey by Tyler Cowen (2025) 

Sunday, March 29, 2026

How are higher energy prices impacting the economy?

See How Americans Are Navigating Higher Energy Costs on Every Front: Borrowed Costco memberships, fewer nights out and skipped road trips. ‘You better watch your account to the penny’ by Rachel Wolfe of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"Consumers around the country say they are rejiggering their routines in efforts to cut their energy usage at home and on the road. They are also starting to cut back on discretionary purchases to make up for rising costs elsewhere. For an economy driven by consumer spending, such changes in behavior matter.

High prices for electricity and natural gas used for heating and cooking already have alarmed consumers and played into local elections. For the past year, falling gasoline prices acted as a shock absorber, offsetting an 11% year-over-year increase in the price of natural gas and 5% rise in electricity. That reprieve ended this month, and could last as the war with Iran drags into its fourth week.

The national average for a gallon of regular has just about reached $4—climbing more than $1 in the past 30 days."

"Although $4 today, adjusted for inflation, is less than in previous price spikes, the last time gas hit a national average of $4 a gallon in 2022, it helped trigger a broader pullback in discretionary spending."

"California has some of the nation’s highest gas prices because of taxes, environmental requirements and a lack of refinery infrastructure in the state, which has helped push the state’s residents toward electric vehicles."

"The U.S. has become less energy dependent, and Americans consume less gasoline relative to their inflation-adjusted incomes than during previous price spikes, thanks to increased energy efficiency and generally rising incomes."

"consumers expect the bump at the pump to precipitate broader inflation, as has happened in the past."

Next see The Low Cost of High Gasoline Prices by Mitch Zimmer. Excerpts:

"In May 2018 . . . gasoline prices were up roughly 50 cents from the previous year."

"My family routinely drives 600 miles round trip to a house in the mountains for Memorial Day."  

Just how much was that 50 cents a gallon going to cost everyones?

"My car gets 30 miles per gallon, so it would require 20 gallons of gasoline for a 600-mile trip. The more expensive gasoline would add $10 to the cost of the trip."

His point was that the price increase was not all that costly. Even if gas was up a $1, it would only increase the price of the trip by $20.

Then see Postal Service to Impose Its First-Ever Fuel Surcharge on Packages: The 8% fee, to cover rising fuel and transportation costs, will be applied to packages but not the mail, as the agency looks to stabilize its finances by Esther Fung of The WSJ. Excerpts:

"The U.S. Postal Service plans to impose its first-ever surcharge on packages to cover the rising cost of fuel"

"The 8% surcharge will begin on April 26"

"Other parcel carriers, including FedEx and United Parcel Service, have imposed fuel surcharges for years"

"Diesel prices reached $5.38 a gallon this week, up 51% from a year earlier."

"Amazon.com is planning to sharply cut the number of packages it ships

When the price of a resource rises, supply shifts to the left. The price of the good or service rises and quantity falls. We see this in the article. 

Related post:

Stagflation, Recession? Probably Not (2026)

"The economy has grown more resilient to oil shocks, and a productivity renaissance is under way, helped by artificial intelligence. Both should help sustain growth and cushion cost pressures."

"The U.S. consumed 4% less gasoline in 2025 than in 2007, while producing 42% more goods and services (as measured by gross domestic product, adjusted for inflation). The share of households’ consumption of energy, including electricity, natural gas and gasoline, fell from 5.7% in 2007 to 3.7% last year."

"the shale revolution has turned the U.S. into a net exporter of petroleum and major exporter of liquefied natural gas. That means the hit to consumers is offset by a boost to producers."

Saturday, March 28, 2026

Enhanced workforce participation and college attainment among women has transformed the marriage market with the trend toward preferences for similarity, particularly concerning income, education, and skills

See Marriage Market Sorting in the U.S. by Anton Cheremukhin, Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria and Antonella Tutino.

Abstract 

"We examine shifts in the U.S. marriage market, assessing how online dating, demographic changes, and evolving societal norms influence mate choice and broader sorting trends. Using a targeted search model, we analyze mate selection based on factors such as education, age, race, income, and skill. Intriguingly, despite the rise of online dating, preferences, mate choice, and overall sorting patterns showed negligible change from 2008 to 2021. However, a longer historical view from 1960 to 2020 reveals a trend toward preferences for similarity, particularly concerning income, education, and skills. Our findings refute two out of three potential explanations – reduced search costs and growing spatial segregation – as potential causes of these long-term shifts. In particular, we conclude that people’s capacity to process and evaluate information hasn’t improved despite technological advancements. Among the remaining demographic factors, we identify enhanced workforce participation and college attainment among women as the primary drivers of the U.S. marriage market transformation. Furthermore, we find that the corresponding changes in mate preferences and increased assortativeness by skill and education over this timeframe account for about half of the increased income inequality among households."

Related posts:

Why Marriage Is Increasingly for the Affluent: The economic contract of marriage has shifted, and now young people are looking for financial stability before the wedding (2025) 

Jane Austen was wrong: women don’t marry up for money and status: A new study debunks the myth of the gold-digging wife, finding that women are no more likely to marry above their social class than men (2025)

When It Comes to Marriage and Money, Opposites Attract (2023)

As more people choose to marry someone with a similar income, inequality increases (2020) 

The preference for partners of the same education has significantly increased for white individuals (2017)

"Among students in the bottom socioeconomic quartile, 15 percent had earned a bachelor’s degree within eight years of their expected high school graduation, compared with 22 percent in the second quartile, 37 percent in the third quartile, and 60 percent in the top quartile."

"Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating....[I]f matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller""  

Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman’s family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict (2017)

What Do Men In China Need To Get A Bride? (2011)

There really is a marriage market in many countries (2011)

Do Women Really Value Income over Looks in a Mate? by Marina Adshade (2010) 

Do Opposites Attract? Not Usually, Except Maybe When It Comes To Money (2009)

When Women Earn More Than Men, Is Dating Affected? (2007) 

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Does working from home raise lifetime fertility?

See Work from Home and Fertility by Steven J. Davis, Cevat Giray Aksoy, Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom, Katelyn Cranney, Mathias Dolls & Pablo Zarate. 

Abstract

"We investigate how fertility relates to work from home (WFH) in the post-pandemic era, drawing on original data from our Global Survey of Working Arrangements and U.S. Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes. Realized fertility from 2023 to 2025 and future planned fertility are higher among adults who WFH at least one day a week and, for couples, higher yet when both partners do so. Estimated lifetime fertility is greater by 0.32 children per woman when both partners WFH one or more days per week as compared to the case where neither does. The implications for national fertility rates differ across countries due mainly to large differences in WFH rates. In a complementary analysis using other U.S. data before and after the pandemic, one-year fertility rates rise with WFH opportunities in one's own occupation and, for couples, in the partner's occupation."

Related posts:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Should the Government Pay People to Have Sex? (2007) 

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

Elites moved toward democrats more than nonelites moved away: Income, education, and occupational class in US presidential elections, 1980–2020

By Karyn Vilbig & Paula England

"Recent work on partisan realignment has often highlighted shifts among the White working class. Examining elections from 1980 to 2020, we show that the partisan realignment of White voters has been primarily driven by higher status Whites—those with the highest decile household incomes, college degrees, and white-collar jobs—making large moves toward the Democratic Party. Working-class Whites, however, show no clear long-term trend. They have indeed become less Democratic since 2012, but these levels remain within historically observed bounds.

Recent discussion of voting in US elections claims a strong movement of White working-class voters away from voting for Democrats, with much discussion focusing only on elections between 2012 and the present. We examine longer-term trends from 1980 to 2020 in how more and less privileged White voters—measured by household income, education, and occupational class—moved toward or away from voting Democratic. We also explore how these movements changed the shape of the relationships between these three socioeconomic indicators and voting Democratic. We find little evidence of a long-term movement away from Democrats among voters with lower income, less education, or working-class jobs, although there is some evidence of this after 2012. The clearest long-term trend is that voters in the highest decile of income, college graduates, and white-collar workers moved steadily toward voting Democratic across the 40 y. Thus, the change from negative to flat for income’s relationship to voting Democratic, and from negative to positive for education’s relationship to voting Democratic comes less from a movement of less privileged voters away from Democratic voting and more from a long-term movement of those in the top decile of income, college graduates, and white-collar workers toward voting Democratic. Whether the post-2012 movement away from voting Democratic among voters without a high school degree and in working-class jobs becomes an enduring trend or is idiosyncratic to Trump’s candidacy is an important question for future research."

Related posts:

People gave up a chance to win money in order to avoid hearing from those with opposing political views (2017) 

People say the president can control gas prices if the president belongs to the other party (2017)

Are some blue jeans really Democratic and others Republican? (2019)

Why Are Americans So Distrustful of Each Other? (2021)

"In 2017, around 70% of Democrats said that Donald Trump voters couldn't be trusted, and around 70% of Republicans said the same of Hillary Clinton voters" 

More and more, executives at major corporations belong to the same politcal party and tend to leave their companies if they are in the minority party there (2022) 

Adam Smith Meets Jonathan Haidt (on political polarization and the animosity of hostile factions)  (2023)

Why Tribalism Took Over Our Politics: Social science gives an uncomfortable explanation: Our brains were made for conflict (2023) 

Democrats and Republicans say economy is improving, but mostly only when someone from their party is president (2024) 

Did Fracking in Pennsylvania Turn Democrats Into Republicans and Republicans Into Democrats? (2024)

Are fewer Democrats buying Teslas because of Elon Musk's political views? (2024)

Partisanship deeply colors how Americans think about trade policy, especially tariffs (2024) 

Would you give up some income in order to get a job at a firm whose workers share your political opinions? (2024)

Republicans Are Feeling Good Again, Driving Up Consumer Sentiment: Democrats’ sentiment slips, but overall index ticks higher (2024)

Causes and Extent of Increasing Partisan Segregation in the U.S. – Evidence from Migration Patterns of 212 Million Voters (2025)

Red vs. Blue Is Dividing Stock Portfolios Like Never Before: A political gap in optimism about markets is translating into trading decisions (2025)

Can testosterone shift political preferences? (2025)

What does conservatism mean? Fewer taxes & regulations or preserving traditional values and communities? A Republican county in Tennessee faces this question when farmers go against land developers (2025)

Poor whites used to vote for Democratic presidential candidates while rich whites voted Repulican. This has now reversed (2026) 

See also Americans start caring more about deficits and the national debt when the party they oppose runs them up by John V. Kane of New York University and Ian G. Anson of The University of Maryland. Excerpt:

"In the past two decades, US budget deficits have skyrocketed, and the national debt is now over $22 trillion. But do Americans care about the size of deficits and the national debt? In new research, John V. Kane and Ian G. Anson find that people tend to care more about the deficits and debts when they are increased by presidents from the party that they oppose. Both Republicans and Democrats, they write, become less concerned about governments running deficits when their President is in charge."